The phenomena of mental dysfunction and brain disorder are believed to be highly related – nevertheless, the details of the relationship are still vague and unclear. In unfortunate effect, traditionally two separate ways have developed to conceptualize and treat the phenomena in question: either by treating the brain, or by treating the mind. Modern research aims at closing the gauge between these approaches conceptually and empirically to provide for integrated explanation and hence successful therapy.

Until recently the phenomena of brain disorder and mental dysfunction have been dealt with rather independently. On the one hand, there is a strong tradition in philosophy, cognitive psychology and cognitive psychiatry to conceptualize mental dysfunctions as disturbances of the abstract cognitive organization of the mind; often without paying much attention to its alleged neural basis.

On the other hand, various other disciplines, most notably biologically oriented psychology, psychiatry and neurology have attempted to link dysfunctions of our cognitive performance to brain structures and their pathology; often without proper backing by a framework of cognitive organization.

Modern scientific research must cover both – the cognitive properties of fundamental cognitive functions as well as the neuronal underpinnings of their disturbance in neurological and psychiatric diseases. In order to define mental dysfunctions, we must specify the type and degree of alterations within fundamental mental functions and their underlying brain dysfunctions.

In addition, researchers in medical ethics and neurology have focused on the brain as a putative precondition of human life and moral status. The absence of brain disorders and mental dysfunctions has been claimed to be a precondition for full normative capacities such as responsibility and rationality. Thus, very specific empirical questions about brain disorders and mental dysfunction have been bound together with very general topics in the humanities.

Thus, research within the School focuses on the notions of selective attention, executive control, affective states, memory and the ability of adequate fears. All these functions are closely related to the individual experience of a coherent “self”, to the ability for rational deliberation, decision making and agency. In addition to experimental work, we address conceptual issues raised by philosophers who find it dubitable that certain normative faculties are within the scope of what can be investigated on a solely empirical basis.