Facets of Self-Consciousness

International workshop with Bermúdez, Dainton, Legrand, Newen, de Vignemont, Zahavi

Organized by Katja Crone, Kristina Musholt, and Anna Strasser

• José L. Bermúdez (Washington University St. Louis)
• Barry Dainton (University of Liverpool)
• Dorothée Legrand (CREA)
• Albert Newen (Universität Bochum) 
• Frédérique de Vignemont (NYU)
• Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen)

“Facets of self-consciousness” The problem of self-consciousness is a central problem of philosophy. Self-consciousness, or the ability to think about oneself as oneself, is at the root of our ability for moral self-evaluation, or our ability to create a narrative identity, and has interesting implications concerning social cognition.  Accordingly, many attempts have been made to provide a theory of self-consciousness, and, following the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy, such a theory is often thought to be found through an analysis of the linguistic expressions of self-consciousness, in particular the semantics of the first person pronoun (Spitzley 2000). However, this way of approaching the problem has recently been called into question by proponents of theories of nonconceptual content who argue that we ought to look at the nonconceptual ways of representing the self that provide the foundation for our later ability to acquire a concept of ourselves(Bermúdez 1998; Legrand 2006;2007). Other issues that have recently found new or renewed attention are the social roots and the diachronic structure of self-consciousness (Newen & Fiebich 2009; de Vignemont 2010; Zahavi 2001). Unfortunately though, as of yet, discussions of these different facets of self-consciousness have remained rather isolated, due in part to the different methodological angles from which they tend to be approached. The aim of this workshop is to mitigate this shortcoming by bringing together a number of carefully selected articles that will explore and bridge the different facets of self-consciousness. The workshop will consist of three sections. Friday, 26 March 2010 Section 1: Nonconceptual and conceptual forms of self-representation / chair: Kristina Musholt
14.00: introduction
14.30: José L. Bermúdez: Non-conceptual Self-Consciousness and the Sense of "I" / 15.00: discussion
16.00: break
16.30: Dorothée Legrand: Multidimensionality of Bodily Self-Consciousness  / 17.00: discussion
19.00: dinner Saturday, 27 March 2010 Section 2: Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity / chair: Anna Strasser
10.00: Albert Newen: Understanding Oneself and Understanding Others: The Interdependence of Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity / 10.30: discussion
11.30: break
12.00: Fréderérique de Vignemont: Vicarious Pain / 12.30: discussion
13.30: lunch Section 3: Self and Time / chair: Katja Crone
15.00: Dan Zahavi: Time and Self: From Experience to Narration / 15.30: discussion
16.30: break
17.00: Barry Dainton: Selfhood and the flow of Experience / 17.30: discussion
18.30: conclusions

Bermúdez & Legrand

The first section will deal with the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual ways of representing the self. Proponents of nonconceptual content hold that there are ways of representing the world that are independent of the possession of the concepts needed to specify the content of these representations.This has been applied to the problem of self-consciousness by authors who argue that there are nonconceptual forms of self-representation; candidates for these are, for example, ecological perception, somatic proprioception, or the sense of agency (e.g. Hurley, 1997; Bermúdez, 1998; Vosgerau, 2009). Proponents of this view often make use not only of insights from philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, but also from the empirical sciences, such as developmental psychology or cognitive neuroscience and hence offers interesting connections to these areas of research(Legrand 2006; Bermúdez 1998).In addition, the debate on nonconceptual self-consciousness offers intriguing, albeit often neglected, connections to the notion of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (Frank 1991), as well as to phenomenological investigations of the structure of self-consciousness that have recently gained renewed attention (e.g., Zahavi 2005; Crone 2009). The aim of the talks dealing with this aspect will be to further explore the connections mentioned above as well as to provide an account of the transition between nonconceptual and conceptual ways of representing the self. In doing so, they will also span a bridge to the other two sections of the workshop, in particular with regard to the question of whether intersubjectivity and/or diachronic self-consciousness play a role in the transition between nonconceptual and conceptual self-consciousness.

Newen & de Vignemont

The second section deals with the role of intersubjectivity for the development of self-consciousness. Although this aspect of self-consciousness is neglected by many theories of self-consciousness, an exploration of the ontogenetic roots of our ability for self-conscious thought quickly brings to the forefront the interaction with others as an essential condition for the acquisition of this ability. There are different perspectives from which this issue can be discussed: (I) Phenomenological analyses show that self-consciousness and intersubjectivity are inextricably linked to each other (Husserl1973; Zahavi 2001) and that social interaction - in various forms - is an importan component in the development of awareness of oneself and others (Gallagher & Hutto 2008). (II) Insights from cognitive science and developmental psychology suggest that self-consciousness develops in correlation with the development of a theory of mind (Happé 2003). (II) Following Strawson (1959) and Evans (1982) one can argue that the ability to ascribe states and properties to oneself implies the ability to ascribe these also to others who are not oneself. The topic also offers interesting relations to questions of embodiment (de Vigenmont & Goldman 2009) and the relationship between self-consciousness, intersubjectivity and narrative identity (Nelson 2003). The talks of this section will critically explore these different perspectives and their relation to each other as well as to the topics discussed in sections one and three.

Zahavi & Dainton

The third section will deal with the temporal structure of self-consciousness. Debates on self-consciousness rarely address the characteristic temporal structure of self-consciousness. However, it seems to be a fact that self-consciousness does not occur punctually but that it is rather continuous in time. Self-consciousness, taken as a mental process, is not only a temporally extended episode itself; it also represents the subject's own diachronic persistence (Bieri 1986; Dainton 2000). The distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content seems to be equally applicable to the representation of time: in a nonconceptual form diachronic self-consciousness can be described as the temporally extended perspective of the experiencing subject, which may be elucidated with the help of phenomenological theories of "inner" time consciousness (Husserl 1985; Zahavi 2003;2007; Gallagher 2005). In a conceptual form diachronic self-consciousness is narrative in structure and integrates different life episodes allowing for a (more or less) coherent self-understanding (Gallagher 2007; Hutto 2007). The relation between those different modes remains until now rather unexplored. Focussing on temporal aspects of self-consciousness allows for promising systematic insights into different recent debates, such as analytical and phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness and time consciousness as well as theories of the transtemporal identity of sentient beings. The talks aim at shedding light both on the relation between nonconceptual and conceptual modes of temporally structured self-consciousness and on the role of intersubjectivity with respect to a coherent diachronic self-understanding. We have a limited number of places available for workshop participants. Applicants should have or be working towards a PHD in philosophy, should have an active research interest in one or more of the topics covered by the workshop.  Participants are expected to prepare for the workshop by reading a selection of articles that will be distributed prior in the start of the meeting. Please send an email including a statement of interest and a brief description of your own relevant research project(s) to self.berlin@googlemail.com
by February 1, 2010, if you would like to participate. Notification of acceptance: February 15, 2010. There is a participation fee of €10 to cover the costs of refreshments, to be paid on arrival. google-Map Sponsored by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Berlin School of Mind and Brain

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